ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
The Nature of Banks and the Money Creation Process; Criticism of Common Views and Implications
The financial crisis in 2008 attracted the attention of the economists and central banks to the deficiencies of the common views on the nature of banks and their role in economy. Since an important prerequisite for micro-prudential and macro-prudential regulation is macroeconomic modeling including the financial sector, consistent monetary and fiscal policy making, and a correct and complete analysis about the nature of banks and the banking system, the present paper uses a descriptive-analytical method to investigate the three approaches to it. Thus, the common views about banks (“financial intermediation” and “deposit multiplier”) are explained and criticized on the basis of monetary and accounting principles. Moreover, the correct view about the nature of banks ("money creation of individual banks") will be explained, citing the opinions of leading economists and central banks.
Analyzing the arguments offered in support of the “financial intermediation” and “deposit multiplier” views shows that the main roots of misunderstanding the nature of banks are: the notion about money being a sort of commodity, fallacy of composition and the confusion of microeconomic and macroeconomic arguments, neglecting the double-entry bookkeeping principles, failing to differentiate between the banks’ and the central bank’s balance sheet, and lack of attention to the implications of interest rates targeting policy by the central banks. Accordingly, some principles adhering to which can guarantee a correct analysis of banks is introduced, and some implications of “money creation” view about banks in Islamic banking, monetary policy, banking regulation and macroeconomic modeling is explained.
https://iee.rihu.ac.ir/article_1441_494a83a6b5398507e9ba84895f862fa9.pdf
2018-03-21
9
38
10.30471/iee.2018.1441
bank
creation of money
financial intermediation
deposit multiplier
banking regulation
monetary policy
Islamic banking
Akbar
Kumijani
komijani@ut.ac.ir
1
Professor of Economics/ Tehran University
AUTHOR
Hamid
Abrishami
abrihami@ut.ac.ir
2
Professor of Economics/ Tehran University
AUTHOR
Sayyid Ali
Rohani
s.ali.rohani@gmail.com
3
PhD Student of Economics/ Tehran University
LEAD_AUTHOR
1. توتونچیان، ایرج (1375)، اقتصاد پول و بانکداری، تهران: مؤسسه تحقیقات پولی و بانکی.
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2. ـــــــــــــ (1379)، پول و بانکداری اسلامی و مقایسه آن با نظام سرمایهداری، تهران: توانگران.
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3. درودیان، حسین؛ دولتآبادی؛ سیدمهدی و سیدعلی روحانی (1396)، اعسار پنهان در نظام بانکی ایران: چیستی، ابعاد و ریشهها، تهران: مرکز پژوهشهای مجلس، شماره مسلسل 15514.
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5. سبحانی، حسن و حسین درودیان (1395)، «ارزیابی توجیه پذیری خلق پول به وسیله سیستم بانکی در نظام بانکداری اسلامی»، فصلنامه اقتصاد اسلامی، دوره 16، ش64، ص31−54.
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6. صدر، محمدباقر (1388)، البنک اللاربوی فیالاسلام، ترجمه سیدیحیی علوی، تهران: دانشگاه امام صادقj.
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8. موسویان، سیدعباس و حسین میثمی (1396)، بانکداری اسلامی، بانکداری مرکزی اسلامی و سیاستگذاری پولی و ارزی، تهران: پژوهشکده پولی و بانکی.
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9. میرمعزی، سیدحسین (1384)، «الگوی ذخایر سپردههای بانکی در بانکداری اسلامی»، اقتصاد اسلامی، سال پنجم، ش17، ص45−74.
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10. Abel, A., & Bernanke, B. (1992), Macroeconomics, Adison-Wesley Publishing Company.
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11. Barro, R. (1987), Macroeconomics (second ed.), John Wiley & Sons.
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12. Berry, S., Harrison, R., Thomas, R., & Weymarn, I. (2007), “Interpreting Movements In Broad Money”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q 3.
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13. Bindseil, U. (2004), “The Operational Target of Monetary Policy and the Rise and Fall of Reserve Position Doctrine”, European Central Bank Working Paper, No. 372, PP. 1-44.
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27. Keister, T., & McAndrews, J. (2009), “Why Are Banks Holding So Many Excess Reserves?”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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31. Mankiw, G. (2003), Macroeconomics (Fifth ed.), Worth Publisher.
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33. McLeay, M., Radia, A., & Thomas, R. (2014 Q1), Money creation in the modern economy. London: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin.
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34. Mishkin, F., Matthews, K., & Giuliodori., M. (2013), The Economics of Money, Banking & Financial Markets - European ed. London: Pearson Education Limited.
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35. Phillips, C. A., (1920), Bank Credit, Macmillan.
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37. Samuelson, P., (1948), Economics, McGraw-Hill.
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38. Samuelson, P., & Nordhaus, W. (1995), Economics (fifteenth ed.), McGraw-Hill.
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39. Sheard, P. (2013), “Repeat After Me: Banks Cannot And Do Not "Lend Out" Reserves”,. Standard & Poors - Ratings Direct .
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40. Smith, W. (1959), “Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Controls”,. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 73, Issue 4, PP. 533-553.
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41. Stiglitz, J., & Walsh, C. (2002), Principles of Macroeconomics (third ed.), W.W. Norton & Company.
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42. Tobin, J. (1963), “Commercial Banks as Creators of Money”, Cowels Foundation Discussion Paper, No 159.
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43. Turner, A. (2013), “Credit, Money and Leverage: What Wicksell, Hayed and Fisher Knew and Modern Macroeconomics Forg”, Conference on: “Towards a Sustainable Financial System”, Stockholm.
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44. Werner, R. (2014), “Can banks individually create money out of nothing - The Theories and the Empirical Evidence”, International Review of Financial Analysis .
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45. Werner, R., (2016)., “A Lost Century in Economics: Three Theories of Banking and the Conclusive Evidence”, International Review of Financial Analysis.
45
46. Woodford, M. (2010), “Financial Intermediation and Macroeconomic Analysis”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 24, No. 4, PP. 21-44.
46
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
Investigation of Risk Coverage in Issuing Manufacturing Contracts in Operational Models of Parallel Manufacturing Contracts, Stock Exchange Model and Indirect Manufacturing Contracts
Applying different methods and tools to finance different economic sectors always accompany risk, and risk and return on investment and financing always accompany one another. Thus, the investment decisions are always done on the basis of and by considering the relationship between risk and returns. Investors should always consider, in their decisions, the risk factor. Because of the importance and effectiveness of the risk, as well as the impossibility of eliminating it, one must identify, calculate and manage the risks.
The need to pay attention to this issue is due to the fact that expansion and deepening of the financial market in the country should be done to eliminate the country's restrictions on the attraction of investments according to religious considerations and, at the same time, the response to the basic needs of the society should be done by expansion of the capital market of Iran and diversifying its existing tools. Introduction of manufacturing contracts papers as a powerful financial tool for financing various economic sectors can solve many challenges of Iran's financing system considering the potential and actual risk assessment and design of risk coverage of these securities to expand and publicly accept it in Iran's financial system.
In this paper, we employed descriptive-analytic method by using questionnaire data and AHP method to study the hypothesis that "Among the operational models of manufacturing contracts, the Stock Exchange Organization model is the optimal model for risk coverage."
To examine this hypothesis, some risks of issuing embedded securities in the form manufacturing contract model in the form of parallel manufacturing contract, stock market model, and indirect manufacturing contract were studied. The results show that among the operating models of embedded securities, the stock model is the best model for risk coverage.
https://iee.rihu.ac.ir/article_1442_97be614bd1d037c36fdceac2a52fbe33.pdf
2018-03-21
39
67
10.30471/iee.2018.1442
manufacturing contract papers
operational models
risk coverage of manufacturing contract papers
AHP method
Muhammad Naqi
Nazarpoor
mnnazarpur@gmail.com
1
Associate Professor of Economics/ Mufid University
AUTHOR
Ruhullah
Ibadi
ebadi.ro@gmail.com
2
PhD Student of Economic Sciences/ Research Center of Hawzeh and University
LEAD_AUTHOR
Sayyid Hdi
Mir-Husseini
s.h.mirhosseyni@gmail.com
3
MA of Financial Management/ Azad University in Qods City
AUTHOR
1. ابزری، مهدی؛ سعید صمدی و هادی تیموری (1386)، «بررسی عوامل مؤثر بر ریسک و بازده سرمایهگذاری در محصولات مالی»، روند، ش54 و 55، ص123−152.
1
2. ابنمنظور، لسان العرب.
2
3. اداره آمار و برنامهریزی بانک سینا (1388)، «نگاهی اجمالی بر: مدیریت ریسک در نظام بانکی»، تهران: اداره انتشارات.
3
4. زرقاء، انس (1380)، «گواهی استصناع (سفارش ساخت)»، اقتصاد اسلامی، ترجمه محمدزمان رستمی، س1، ش1، ص120−128.
4
5. سروش، ابوذر و مجتبی کاوند (1390)، «ریسکهای اوراق رهنی اسلامی و برخی راهکارهای پوشش آنها در ایران»، جستارهای اقتصادی، س8، ش16، ص117−145.
5
6. سروش، ابوذر و محسن صادقی (1387)، «مدیریت ریسک اوراق بهادار اجاره (صکوک اجاره)»، اقتصاد اسلامی، ش27، ص157−186.
6
7. السویلم، ابراهیم (1386)، پوشش ریسک در مالی اسلامی، ترجمه محمد علیزاده اصل، مهدی عسگری و مهدی حاجی رستملو، تهران: دانشگاه امام صادقg.
7
8. فراهانیفرد، سعید (1388)، «صکوک سلف؛ ابزاری مناسب برای تأمین مالی و پوشش ریسک»، اقتصاد اسلامی، ش33، ص7−32.
8
9. کمیجانی، اکبر و محمدنقی نظرپور (1386)، «تأمین مالی طرحهای اقتصادی از طریق اوراق استصناع و چگونگی بهکارگیری آن در بازار بورس»، مجموعه مقالات کنفرانس بینالمللی تأمین مالی اسلامی، مرکز مطالعات تکنولوژی دانشگاه صنعتی شریف.
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10. مزینی، امیرحسین (1389)، امکانسنجی انتشار اوراق صکوک در اقتصاد ایران مطالعه موردی بخش معدن و صنایع معدنی، تهران: انتشارات پژوهشکده اقتصاد دانشگاه تربیت مدرس.
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11. موسویان، سیدعباس و حسین شیرمردی احمدآباد (1391)، «مدیریت ریسکهای اوراق بهادار مضاربه با تأکید بر فقه امامیه»، تحقیقات مالی−اسلامی، س2، ش1 (پیاپی 3)، ص39−68.
11
12. میرفیض، فلاح شمس و مهدی رشنو (1387)، «ریسک در صکوک و مصونسازی آن براساس موازین شرعی»، مجموعه مقالات نوزدهمین همایش بانکداری اسلامی، تهران: مؤسسه عالی بانکداری ایران.
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13. نظرپور، محمدنقی (1384)، «اوراق بهادار استصناع (سفارش ساخت) ابزاری برای سیاست پولی»، اقتصاد اسلامی، ش20، ص81−110.
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14. نظرپور، محمدنقی (1392)، عقد و اوراق استصناع کاربردهای استصناع در بازارهای مالی اسلامی، قم: دانشگاه مفید و سمت.
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15. نظرپور، محمدنقی و ایوب خزائی (1389)، «طراحی پوشش ریسک صکوک استصناع در بازار بورس اوراق بهادار»، سیاستهای اقتصادی (نامه مفید) ش۸۱، ص3−26.
15
16. نوِو، ریموند پی (1385)، مدیریت مالی، ترجمه و اقتباس علی جهانخانی و علی پارسائیان، ج1، چ10، تهران: سمت.
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17. هال، جان (1384)، مبانی مهندسی مالی و مدیریت ریسک، ترجمه سجاد سیاح و علی صالح آبادی، چ1، تهران: شرکت کارگزاری مفید.
17
18. Al-Bashir, Muhammad, (2008), “Sukuk Market: Innovations and Challenges”, Islamic Economic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 1-22.
18
19. Crouchy, Michel & Galai, Dan & Mark, Robert, (2006), Essentials of Risk Management, McGraw- Hill.
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20. Khan, Tariqullah & Habib Ahmed (2001), Risk Management: An Analysis of Issues in Islamic Financial Industry, Jeddah, Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI).
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21. Obaidullah, Mohammad (2002), “Islamic Risk Management: Towards Greater Ethics and Efficiency”, International Journal of Islamic Financial Services, Vo1.04, No.3.
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22. Nathif, j. Adam & Abdulkader, Thomas, (2004(, Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to issuing, structuring and investing in Sukuk, Euromoney Books.
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23. Tariq, Ali Arsalan & Dar, Humayon, (2007), “Risks of Sukuk Structures: Implications for Resource Mobilization”, Thunderbird International Business Review, Vol. 49, pp. 203-223.
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24. Tariq, Ali Arsalan, (2004), Managing Financial Risks of Sukuk Structures, Loughborough University.
24
25. Salman, Syed Ali, (2005), “Islamic Capital Market Products: Developmentd and Challenges”, IDB Group, Occasional Paper, No.9, pp. 1-22.
25
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
Investigation of the Composite Index of Economic Resilience in Iran (2005-2014)
In the present article, we have examined the resilience of Iran's economy during the years 2005-2014. To this end, a composite indigenous index comprised of the following variables is calculated and interpreted: inflation rate, unemployment rate, exchange rate, ratio of budget deficit to gross domestic product, share of oil in the government budget, ratio of non-oil exports to imports, import ratio of intermediate and primary goods to total imports, total government budget to gross domestic product, ratio of government consumption to total consumption of the economy, export and import ratio to gross domestic product, underground economy, ratio of high education graduates to total government employees, Gini coefficient, literacy rates and main members f society insured by social security organizations.
The empirical results indicate an increase in the Iran's economic resilience index. The highest figure in the index is in 2014 and the lowest is in 2005. The relationship between resilience index and GDP per capita indicates a positive relationship over the course under study, i.e. with an increase in economic resilience, GDP per capita also increases
https://iee.rihu.ac.ir/article_1443_d9eeeecc8cd9849b8535886da5484237.pdf
2018-03-21
69
94
10.30471/iee.2018.1443
economic resilience
composite index
Iran's economy
resistance economy
Sayyid Hussein
Mir-Jalili
h.jalili@yahoo.com
1
Associate Professor of Economics/ Research Center of Humanities and Cultural Studies
LEAD_AUTHOR
roshanak
bozorgi
roshanakbozorgi@yahoo.com
2
MA Student in Economics/ Research Center of Humanities and Cultural Studies,
AUTHOR
1. آقامحمدی، علی و ابوالفضل غیاثوند (1393)، تابآوری؛ رویکرد مدیریت مخاطرات، تهران: دانشگاه عالی دفاع ملی.
1
2. ابونوری، اسمعیل؛ حسن لاجوردی و زهره بشارتیراد (1395)، «برآورد شاخص تابآوری اقتصادی در ایران و ارائه راهکارهای بهبود»، اولین همایش بینالمللی اقتصاد شهری (با رویکرد اقتصاد مقاومتی؛ اقدام و عمل).
2
3. ابونوری، اسمعیل و حسن لاجوردی (1395)، «برآورد شاخص آسیبپذیری و تابآوری اقتصادی به روش پارامتریکی: بررسی موردی کشورهای عضو اپک»، فصلنامه نظریههای کاربردی اقتصاد، س3، ش3، ص25−44.
3
4. اندرس، والتر (1386) اقتصاد سنجی سریهای زمانی (با رویکرد کاربردی)، ترجمه مهدی صادقی و سعید شوالپور، ج1، تهران: دانشگاه امام صادق j
4
5. پیرایی، خسرو و حسینعلی رجائی (1394)، «اندازهگیری اقتصاد زیرزمینی در ایران و بررسی علل و آثار آن»، فصلنامه سیاستهای راهبردی و کلان، س3، ش9، ص21−42.
5
6. سیاستهای کلی اقتصاد مقاومتی، ارزیابی شاخصهای جهانی برای سنجش درجه مقاومت اقتصادی (1393)، معاونت پژوهشهای اقتصادی مجلس شورای اسلامی.
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7. سوری، علی (1394)، اقتصاد سنجی پیشرفته (جلد2)، همراه با کاربردStata و Eviews، چ3، تهران: نشر فرهنگشناسی.
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8. غیاثوند، ابوالفضل و فاطمه عبدالشاه (1394)، «مفهوم و ارزیابی تابآوری اقتصاد ایران»، فصلنامه پژوهشنامه اقتصادی، س15، ش59، ص161−187.
8
9. غیاثوند، ابوالفضل و الهه رمضانیان (1394)، «ارزیابی میزان تاب آوری اقتصادی ایران طی سالهای 1392−1375»، فصلنامه مطالعات راهبردی بسیج، س18، ش68، ص91−109.
9
10. فروغیزاده، یاسین (1393)، تبیین مفهومی اقتصاد مقاومتی و شاخصسازی و سنجش مقاومتپذیری اقتصاد ایران، پایاننامه کارشناسی ارشد، تهران: دانشکده اقتصاد و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه امام صادقg.
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11. وثوقی، عفیفه (1395)، تأثیر آسیبپذیری و تابآوری اقتصادی بر تغییرپذیری تولید ناخالص داخلی سرانه، پایاننامه کارشناسی ارشد، دانشکده اقتصاد، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی.
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12. Briguglio, L. & Galea, W., (2003), “Updating and Augmenting the Economic Vulnerability Index”, Occasional Paper on Islands and Small States, No. 2004/4. Malta: Islands and Small States Institute of the University of Malta.
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13. Briguglio, L., Cordina, G., Farrugia, N., & Vella, S., (2006), “Conceptualising and Measuring Economic Resilience”, In Briguglio, L., Cordina, G., and kisanga E.J. (eds) Building the Economic Resilience of Small States, Malta: Islands and Small States Institute and London: Commonwealth Secretariat, pp. 265-287.
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14. Briguglio, L., Cordina, G., Farrugia, N. and Vella, S, (2008), “Economic Vulnerability and Resilience: Concepts and Measurements”, Research Paper, No. 2008/55, UNU-WIDER.
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15. Briguglio, Lino, and Stephen Piccinino, “Growth and Resilience in East Asia and The Impact of the 2009 Global Recession”, Available at: http://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/141959/Growth_with_Resilience_in_Asia_5Dec 2011. Pdf.
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16. Briguglio, L., (2011), Growth with Resilience: Perspectives From the Commonwealth and the Francophonie and Recommendations to the G20, A study commissioned by the Commonwealth Secretariat and La Francophonie. Retrieved from http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/237409/FileName/Growthwithresilience2.pdf.
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17. Briguglio, Lino, (2014), A Vulnerability and Resilience Framework for Small States, University of Malta.
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18. Briguglio Lino, (2016),"Exposure to External Shocks and Economic Resilience of Countries: Evidence from Global Indicators", Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 43 Issue: 6, pp.1057-1078, https://doi.org/10.1108/JES-12-2014-0203 .
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20. Cerra,V. and Saxena,S.C, (2008), “Growth Dynamics: the Myth of Economic Recovery”, The American Economic Review,Vol.98, No.1, pp.439-457.
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21. Cordina, G., (2004), “Economic Vulnerability and Economic Growth: Some Results from a Neo-classical Growth Modelling Approach”, Journal of Economic Development, 29(2), 21-40. Retrieved from.
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22. Human Development, (2014), Report Sustaining Human Progress Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
22
23. Oxford Metrica, (2016), “The 2016 FM Global Resilience Index”, Annuanl Report.
23
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
Investigating the Possibility of Using Credit Default Swaps to Cover Sukuk Credit Risk
Issuing Islamic securities (sukuk) is one of the innovations of recent decades that open bright opportunities to the Islamic financial system. In this article, we have dealt with the management of credit risk to cover these risks. So far, the financial rules in Iran (rules of the Securities and Exchange Money and Credit Council and the Council) have attempted to create warranty pay guarantee obligations to cover credit risk for investors. Considering the fact that there are numerous methods to manage credit risks, the main question of this article is as follows: “which method is more preferable?” Library research shows that there are two major methods in managing credit risks: validation and credit default swap. Assuming that redressing not paying off the debts is the necessary condition for issuing sukuk, the guarantor and credit default swaps can do this. This article first enumerates the advantages and disadvantages of each method as well as getting the views of the experts through TOPSIS process, and then, introduces the credit default swap as a better way in issuing sukuk.
https://iee.rihu.ac.ir/article_1444_d49fe60650f3a43ca20e7e9252c284e4.pdf
2018-03-21
95
120
10.30471/iee.2018.1444
Sukuk
credit risk
risk coverage
Sukuk guarantor
credit default swap
Muhammad Hadi
Habibullahi
mhhabib.67@gmail.com
1
PhD Student of Financial Management in Imam Sadeq University/ Researcher in Development Center of the University
LEAD_AUTHOR
Ihsan Zaker-nia
Zaker-nia
ehsanzakernia@gmail.com
2
PhD Student of Financial Management in Imam Sadeq University/ Researcher in Development Center of the University
AUTHOR
1. آذر، عادل و علی رجبزاده (1389)، تصمیمگیری کاربردی رویکرد MADM، تهران: نگاه دانش.
1
2. آقا مهدوی، اصغر و سیدمحمدمهدی موسوی (1387)، «ریسک اعتباری در بانکداری اسلامی و امکان استفاده از تاخت نکول اعتباری جهت کنترل آن»، جستارهای اقتصادی، سال 5، ش9، ص41−66.
2
3. احمدی حاجیآبادی، سیدروحالله (1386)، «بررسی فقهی−نظری اوراق بهادار اسلامی (صکوک)»، راهبرد توسعه، ش12، ص95−112.
3
4. تسخیری، محمدعلی (1386)، «مبانی شرعی اوراق بهادار اسلامی (صکوک)»، اقتصاد اسلامی، ش27، ص7−22.
4
5. حاجی آقایی، بهشاد (1387)، «انواع ریسک و پوششهای آن»، تازههای اقتصاد، ش122، ص58−65.
5
6. خالقیمقدم، حمید، محمدمهدی نادری نورعینی (1387)، «اوراق مشتقه اعتباری»، حسابدار، ش195، ص3−12.
6
7. خوانساری، رسول؛ محمدسجاد سیاهکارزاده و مجید اصغری (1391)، «بررسی فقهی امکان بهکارگیری سوآپ نکول اعتباری و ورق اعتباری در مدیریت ریسک اعتباری بانکها»، تحقیقات مالی اسلامی، سال 2، ش2، ص113−140.
7
8. راعی، رضا و علی سعیدی (1392)، مبانی مهندسی مالی و مدیریت ریسک، تهران: سمت.
8
9. سلیمپور، مریم (1385)، «نگاهی فراتر بر عملکرد مؤسسات رتبهبندی اعتباری»، تازههای اقتصاد، ش113، ص42−51.
9
10. شورای پول و اعتبار، دستورالعمل انتشار صکوک اجاره ریالی، مصوب 16/12/1390.
10
11. شورای عالی بورس، دستورالعمل انتشار اوراق اجاره، مصوب 11/5/1389.
11
12. طالبی، محمد و امیرمحمد رحیمی (1391)، «شناسایی، طبقهبندی و اولویتبندی ریسکهای مربوط به اوراق بهادار اجاره (صکوک اجاره)»، جستارهای اقتصادی، سال 9، ش18، ص77−104.
12
13. عباسی، ابراهیم و آمنه جلیلوند (1394)، «امکانسنجی استفاده از سوآپ نکول اعتباری در بازار پول»، دانش سرمایهگذاری، سال چهارم، ش16، ص45−57.
13
14. عسکری، محمدمهدی و مهدی کریمی (1392)، «امکانسنجی مدیریت ریسک صکوک»، نشریه راهبرد توسعه، ش35، ص63−90.
14
15. قانون نحوه انتشار اوراق مشارکت مصوب 30/6/1376 مجلس شورای اسلامی.
15
16. محمودآبادی، حمید و علی غیوریمقدم (1390)، «رتبهبندی اعتباری از لحاظ توان مالی پرداخت اصل و فرع بدهیها با استفاده از شیوه تحلیل پوششی دادهها»، دانش حسابداری، ش4، ص125-145.
16
17. موسویان، سیدعباس و سیدمحمدمهدی موسوی بیوکی (1388)، «مدیریت ریسک اعتباری در بانکداری اسلامی از طریق سوآپ نکول اعتباری»، فصلنامه اقتصاد اسلامی، سال 9، ش33، ص95−126.
17
18. هیئتمدیره سازمان بورس و اوراق بهادار، دستورالعمل انتشار اوراق مرابحه، مصوب 26/9/90.
18
19. هیئتمدیره سازمان بورس واوراق بهادار، دستورالعمل انتشار اوراق قرضالحسنه، مصوب 17/10/90.
19
20. Saretto, Alessio and Heather E. Tookes, (2013), “Corporate Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Credit Supply: The Role of Credit Default Swaps”, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 1190-1247.
20
21. Blanco, Brennan and March (2003), An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relationship Between Investment-grade, Bonds and Credit Default Swaps, bank of England.
21
22. Bodie, Kane and Marcus, (2009), Investment, Mc Graw Hill, eighth edition.
22
23. Bolton and Oehmke (2010), Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem”, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 15999.
23
24. Greening, H. & Bratanovic, S. (2008), Managing Banking Risk, Mumbai: Jaico Publishing House.
24
25. Hull, j., white, A., (2000), “Valuing Credit Default Swaps i: No Counterparty Default Risk”, journal of derivatives, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 29-40..
25
26. Meissner, G., (2005), Credit Derivatives, Application, Pricing, and Risk Management, oxford, Blackwell publishing.
26
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
The Proper Model for Evaluating Buy-back Contracts in Terms of Economics of Information
Discussions related to the ‘agent’ and ‘employer’ and their interaction in the form of various contracts are among the common discussions in economics. Thus, the contracts and the agent-employer theories have dealt with it in a variety of contexts. Moral hazards in contracts, especially international oil contracts, are a key subject under the economics of information to present motivational models for maximizing the interests of both parties. One of the common oil contracts is the buy-back contract. They have been completed and modified in the course of history in the form of 1st,2nd and 3rd generation contracts. In this article, we have tried, considering the 3rd generation of oil and gas industry specifications, oil contracts and moral hazard models, to choose the proper model for evaluating buy-back contracts. An investigation of various models of moral hazards shows that moral hazard from both parties could be seen in oil contracts and that both are trying to maximizing their profit. Accordingly, standard model is not proper to evaluate this type of contract and two-sided moral hazard models are more proper in oil contracts.
https://iee.rihu.ac.ir/article_1445_eb808c915c8bab45feb251ad9aa654a4.pdf
2018-03-21
121
141
10.30471/iee.2018.1445
Buy-Back Contracts
Asymmetric information
Moral Hazard
two-sided Moral Hazard
Iranian Oil contracts
Muhammad Mahdi
Askari
m.askari@isu.ac.ir
1
Associate Professor in Imam Sadeq University
LEAD_AUTHOR
Hamid Reza
Ma’budi
hrmaboodi@yahoo.com
2
PhD Student of Management of International Contracts in Oil and Gas/ Imam Sadeq Univeristy
LEAD_AUTHOR
1. اخوان، مهدی (1393)، «قرارداد بیع متقابل توسعه فازهای 2 و 3 میدان گازی پارس جنوبی از منظر قراردادهای ناقص»، پژوهشنامه اقتصاد انرژی ایران، دوره 4، ش13، ص1−32.
1
2. حسنتاش، غلامحسین (1385)، «قراردادهای نفتی و عدم تقارن اطلاعات»، اقتصاد انرژی، ش87، ص2−4.
2
3. درخشان، مسعود (1385)، بررسی الگوهای قراردادی مناسب برای تأمین مالی در بخش بالادستی نفت و گاز، تهران: دفتر همکاریهای فناوری ریاست جمهوری.
3
4. سلیمیفر، مصطفی و علی طاهریفرد (1392)، «بررسی قراردادهای نفتی بیع متقابل در چارچوب مدل مخاطرات اخلاقی»، راهبرد توسعه، ش34، ص164−178.
4
5. شاکری، عباس (1386)، اقتصاد خرد2 (نظریهها و کاربردها)، تهران: نشر نی.
5
6. طاهریفرد، علی (1392)، بهینهسازی پویای فرآیند نفت خام در یک مدل تصادفی و مقایسه آن با تولید نفت در چارچوب قراردادهای بیع متقابل: مطالعه موردی میدان درود، پایاننامه دکتری، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد.
6
7. طاهری، شیرین (1384)، «بررسی قراردادهای بیع متقابل در صنایع نفت و گاز ایران از دیدگاههای نظری و کاربردی در چارچوب نظریه قراردادها»، اولین کنفرانس ملینفت، گاز، پتروشیمی و انرژی در افق 1404.
7
8. طبیبیان، محمد (1387)، اقتصاد خرد پیشرفته (مباحثی از مبانی نظری و کاربردی آن)، تهران: پیشبرد.
8
9. مقدم، محمدرضا و محمد مزرعتی (1385)، «مدلسازی و تحلیل قراردادهای بیع متقابل و ارائه مدل بهینهسازی قرارداد در ایران»، تحقیقات اقتصادی، ش76، ص157−182.
9
10. میرجلیلی، حسین (1386)، اقتصاد اطلاعات نامتقارن، تهران: پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی.
10
11. Adelman, M.A., (1972), The World Petroleum Market, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
11
12. Bolton, Patrick, Dewatripont Mathias, (2005), Contract Theory, Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England.
12
13. Brexendorff, A.; & Ule, C., (2007), Investing in the Iranian Oil & Gas Industry: From a Business and Legal Perspective, Bharat Book Bureau.
13
14. Chang, H., Cvitanić, J. Zhou, Y., (2015), “Optimal Contracting with Moral Hazard and Behavioral Preferences”, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 428, PP. 959-981.
14
15. Dailami, Mansoor, Hauswald, Robert, (2000), Risk Shifting and Long Term Risk Shifting and Incomplete Contracting Evidence From the Ras Gas Projecy, The World Bank.
15
16. Dittrich, M, Städter, S., (2015), “Moral Hazard and Bargaining over Incentive Contracts”, Research in Economics, 69, PP: 75-85.
16
17. Farnejad, H., (2009), “How Competitive is the Iranian Buy-Back Contracts in Comparison to Contractual Production Sharing Fiscal Systems?”, OGEL, 1, PP.1-18.
17
18. Kim, S.K., Wang, S., (1998), “Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard”, journal of Economic Theory, 82, PP. 342–378.
18
19. Mitchell, John, Marcel, Valérie and Mitchell, Beth, (2012), What Next for the Oil and Gas Industry, Chatham House.
19
20. Mohammad, N., (2009), “The New Face of Iranian Buyback Contract: Any hope for Foreign Investment?” OGEL, 1, PP. 1-21, www.ogel.org/article.asp? key=2860.
20
21. Nicholson, Walter and Snyder, Christopher, (2012), Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions, 11th ed., South-Western College Publishers.
21
22. Osmundsen, P., Sørenes, T. Toft, A., (2010), “Offshore Oil Service Contracts New Incentive Schemes to Promote Drilling Efficiency”, Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering, 72, PP: 220–228.
22
23. Pongsiri, N., (2004), “Partnerships in oil and gas production-sharing contracts”, The International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol.17, No.4, PP. 431-442.
23
24. Serova, D., (2015), Petroleum Fiscal System Design and Cost-Related Incentives in Oil and Gas Projects: A Comparative Study of UK, Norway, Indonesia and China, Master thesis MSc in Economics and Business Administration, Major in Energy, Natural Resources and the Environment, Norwegian school of economics.
24
25. Vernon, Raymond, (1971), Sovereignty at Bay: The Transnational Spread of U.S. Enterprise, London: Longman.
25
26. Wang, W.Y., Pallis, A.A., (2014), “Incentive Approaches to Overcome Moral Hazard in Port Concession Agreements”, Transportation Research, Part E 67, PP. 1624.
26
27. Williamson, Oliver E., (1996), “Transaction Cost Economics and the Carnegie Connection”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, 31(2), PP. 149-155.
27
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
The Relationship of Corruption, Property Rights, Unequal Incomes and Democracy: Empirical Evidence from Selected Countries
Corruption is a phenomenon of economic, political and cultural disorder, with more or less hazardous effects both in developed and developing countries. In this regard, North and his colleagues (2015) emphasize that only in an open access system (democracy), corruption is controlled and other measures such as improving property rights, although useful in improving the conditions, are not enough to reduce corruption significantly. As this phenomenon is considered one of the most important barriers to growth of developing countries such as Iran with its resistance approaches to economy, identifying the roots and dealing with it has become seriously considered as country's development goals.
The purpose of this study was firstly identifying the phenomenon of corruption in a general equilibrium analysis, and to investigating its relationship with some political-economic influential variables such as property rights and democracy. To do so, a panel model was used to analyze relevant data from 53 selected developing countries for the period of 1996 to 2013. The results indicated a significant negative effect of democracy (-0.49), property rights (-7.56), economic growth (-0.37) and investment (-5.75) on the level of corruption. Moreover, the Gini coefficient of inequality (0.36) and political instability (19.4) showed a significant and positive effect on the corruption index.
In general, economic and political inequalities would weaken the bases of democracy and prepare the ground for a diffusion of corruption in the society. However, the effect of democracy on corruption is dependant on variable of property rights, in a way that with an increase in protection of property rights, democracy can have a better function in controlling corruption, especially in countries with abuse of privileged information in their economy.
https://iee.rihu.ac.ir/article_1446_6d07342c4bd92e2e66122f5c0aa98b4a.pdf
2018-03-21
143
172
10.30471/iee.2018.1446
corruption
inequality of income
democracy
property rights
panel data
Hamid
Sepehrdoust
hamidbasu1340@gmail.com
1
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics & Social Science, Bu-Ali-Sina University
AUTHOR
Adel
Berjisian
adelberjisian@gmail.com
2
Ph.D student of Economics, Faculty of Economics & Social Science, Bu-Ali-Sina University
LEAD_AUTHOR
1. پناهی، حسین و اشرف امینی (1390)، «دولت رانتی، اقتصاد دولتی، فرهنگ سیاسی و سرمایه اجتماعی در ایران»، فصلنامه مطالعات سیاسی و بینالملل، شماره هفتم، صفحات 59−94.
1
2. رفیع پور، فرامرز (1388)، سرطان اجتماعی فساد، تهران: شرکت سهامی انتشار.
2
3. رزآکرمن، سوزان (1385)، فساد و دولت: علتها و پیامدها و اصلاح، ترجمه منوچهر صبوری، تهران: انتشارات پردیس دانش.
3
4. صادقی، حسین؛ عباس عصاری و وحید شقاقی شهری (1389)، «اندازهگیری فساد مالی در ایران با استفاده از منطق فازی (رویکرد اقتصادی)»، پژوهشنامه اقتصادی، سال 10، شماره چهارم، صفحات 139−174.
4
5. صباحی، احمد و سعید ملک الساداتی (1388)، «اثر کنترل فساد مالی بر رشد اقتصادی»، پژوهشنامه بازرگانی، سال 14، شماره 53، صفحات 131−158.
5
6. صیادزاده، علی و زهرا علمی (1390)، «رابطۀ فساد و سرمایۀ اجتماعی در الگوهای رشد»، فصلنامه علمی پژوهشی رفاه، شماره 50، صفحات 7−35.
6
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2. Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. (1997), “National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic”, The Economic Journal, 107) 443(, 1023-1042.
8
3. Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. (1999), “Rents, Competition and Corruption”, The American Economic Review, 89 (4), 982-993.
9
4. Adsera, A. Boix, C. and Payne, M. (2003), “Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, 445-490.
10
5. Alesina, A. and Angeletos, G. (2005), “Corruption, inequality, and fairness”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 52, 1227-1244.
11
6. Ammar S. (1997), Can a developing economy manage its macroeconomy? The case of Thailand, J. Douglas Gibson lecture, School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario.
12
7. Barro, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1995), Economic Growth, MIT Press, U.S.
13
8. Billger, S. M. and Goel, R.K. (2009), “Do Existing Corruption Levels Matter in Controlling Corruption?”, Journal of Development Economics, 90 (2), 299-305.
14
9. Bohara, A.K., Mitchell, N.J. and Mittendorff, C. F. (2004), “Compound Democracy and the Control of Corruption: A Cross-Country Investigation”, Policy Studies Journal, 32 (4), 481-499.
15
10. Bueno de Mesquita. B., Morrow. J.D., Siverson, R. and Smith. A. (2001), “Political Competition and Economic Growth”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, 58-72.
16
11. Case, W. (2002), Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or less, New York: Routledge Curzon: 147-200.
17
12. Cervellati, M., Fortunato, P., and Sunde, U. (2008), “Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions and Development”, Economic Journal, Vol. 118, 1354-1384.
18
13. Chowdhury, S.K. (2004), “The Effect of Democracy and Press Freedom on Corruption: An Empirical Test”, Economics Letters, 85 (1), 93-101.
19
14. Clague C., Keefer P., Knack S., and Olson M., (1996), “Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies”, Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 1, 243-276.
20
15. Emerson, P.M. (2006), Corruption, “Competition and Democracy”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 81, 193-212.
21
16. Fisman, R. and Gatti, R. (2002), “Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries”, Journal of Public Economics, 83 (3), 325-345.
22
17. Glaeser, E.L., Scheinkman, J. and Shleifer, A. (2003), “The Injustice of Inequality”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 50, 199-222.
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18. Goel, R.K. and Nelson, M.A. (2005), “Economic Freedom versus Political Freedom: Cross-Country Influences on Corruption”, Australian Economic Papers, 44 (2), 121-133.
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20. Gradstein, M. (2007), “Inequality, Democracy and Protection of Property Rights”, The Economic Journal. Vol. 117, 252-269.
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21. Gupta, S., Verhoeven, M., and Tiongson, E. R. (2002), “The Effectiveness of Government Spending on Education And Health Care in Developing
27
and Transition Economies”, European Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 18, 717-737.
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33
27. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1999), “The Quality of Government”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, 222-279.
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29. McLeod, R. H. (2005), “The struggle to regain effective government under democracy in Indonesia”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 41 (3), 367-386.
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30. Mahdavy, H. (1970), The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran, Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. M.A. Cook (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
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31. Mauro, P. (1995), “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (3), 681-712.
38
32. Mohtadi, H. and Roe, T.L., (2003), “Democracy, Rent Seeking, Public Spending and Growth”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, 445-466.
39
33. Montinola, G. R. and Jackman, R.W. (2002), “Sources of Corruption: A Cross-National Study”, British Journal of Political Science, 32 (1), 147-170.
40
34. Murphy, K. M. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1993), “Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?”, The American Economic Review, 83 (2), 409-414.
41
35. North. D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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36. North. D., Wallis. J. Weingast. B. (2009), “violence and the rise of open-access orders”, Journal of Democracy, Vol.20, (1), 55-68.
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37. North. D., Wallis. J. Weingast. B. (2015), In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics and the Problems of Development, Chapter 10, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
44
38. Pasuk, P. and Baker, C. (1998), Thailand’s boom and bust, Thailand: Silkworm Books.
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39. Pellegrini, L. (2011), “The Effect of Corruption on Growth and its Transmission Channels”, Corruption, Development and the Environment, Chapter 4, pp. 53-74, Springer.
46
40. Robison, R. and Hadiz, V. R. (2004), Reorganizing power in Indonesia, New York: Routledge Curzon.
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41. Rock, M. (2007), “Corruption and Democracy”, UN/DESA Working Paper, No. 55.
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42. Rock, M. (2009), “Corruption and Democracy”, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 45, 55-75.
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43. Rodrik, D. (2002), “Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them”, NBER WP, NO. 7540.
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ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
The Views of Hayek, Rawls, Motahhari and Sadr on Social Justice with an Emphasis on the Nature of Justice
T
This study explores the concept of social justice based on the ideas of four contemporary theorists, with an emphasis on the nature of justice. Hayek represents libertarians, Rawls as the most prominent political philosopher of current century in the West, and Motahhari and Sadr were selected as Islamic theorists. Hayek only believes in individual justice and maintains that there is no concept as social justice. For him, justice constitutes rules for individual conduct. The concept of “spontaneous order” plays an essential role in his ideas, and he maintains that most of the social phenomena follow such an order.
Rawls’ main goal
sees ‘justice as fairness’ as answering to the demands of both freedom and equality, a challenge posed by the socialist critique of liberal democracy. In this regard justice is an agreement on principles which is reached arbitrarily in “veil of ignorance”. Rawls's main guide in achieving principles of justice is maximin principle and the lack of awareness of individuals about the future social status. Motahari regards justice as observance of the law. He recognizes both the natural rights of the individual and the legal community. According to Shahid Motahari, the only way to legitimize and validate natural rights is to accept the purpose of the world order. In Sadr's view, although justice is one of the three principles of the general construction of Islamic economics, the position of justice is beyond the core and is the foundation stone of the Islamic School of Economics. Additionally, Islam has shown its sensitivity to the final makeup of facilities in society, with two principles: public cooperation and social balance.
https://iee.rihu.ac.ir/article_1447_453ab22ae4bfded3921a2c8b90d6d30a.pdf
2018-03-21
173
199
10.30471/iee.2018.1447
Social Justice
Spontaneous Order
Maximin Principle
natural Rights
Social Balance
Ali-Reza
Jalili Marand
alireza.jalili.m@gmail.com
1
PhD Student of Economic Sciences/ Tabriz University
AUTHOR
Muhammad Ali
Mutaffaker Azad
m.motafakker@gmail.com
2
Professor of Economic Sciences/ Tabriz University
LEAD_AUTHOR
Firooz
Fallahi
firfal@yahoo.com
3
Associate Professor of Economic Sciences/ Tabriz University
AUTHOR
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