An empirical – comparative analysis of the thoughts of John Rawls and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr on economic justice: an experimental economics approach

Authors

1 faculty member, Faculty of Economics, Allameh Tabatabai University, Tehran, Iran

2 PhD. Student of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Allame Tabatabaee University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Due to its innate nature, justice has always been taken into consideration by different people, schools and societies. For this reason, various theories about justice have been formed throughout human history. Numerous theories have been formulated about justice. The purpose of this research is to investigate the degree of people's interest in the theories of economic justice of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, also known as al-Shahīd al-Khāmis, and John Rawls in real conditions based on the laboratory experiment method among 150 students of Tehran universities. The results of this research confirm the greater acceptance of Shahid Sadr's theory of justice in different decision-making situations (without personal benefit (third party) - along with personal benefit - dictator). The analysis of the results of the experimental test based on the logit model shows that the variables of income, age, and social class have a positive effect and the property variable has a negative and significant effect on the persistence of people in choosing the Shahid Sadr's theory in a situation with personal benefit compared to a situation without personal benefit. The marginal effects of the variables of age, income, social class, and ownership are 0.039681%, 0.172866%, 2.202202%, and -0, 542678%, respectively.

Keywords

References

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