A Critical Examination of the Harmonization of Self-Interest and the Realization of Public Good: Insights from Allama Tabatabai’s Thought

Author

Faculty Member, Research Center affiliated with the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

Background and Significance of the Study: The debate on the relationship between self-interest and public good has been a longstanding concern in the history of economics and social sciences. From the mercantilist era to modern economists, a pendulum-like oscillation has persisted between two dominant perspectives: those who argue that pursuing self-interest naturally leads to public good (e.g., Adam Smith and proponents of laissez-faire) and those who emphasize the conflict between the two, advocating state intervention to regulate this relationship (e.g., John Stuart Mill, Arthur Pigou, and John Maynard Keynes). This pendulum movement reflects a lack of consensus in the field, and contemporary economic and social crises—such as the 2008 financial crisis—demonstrate that previous responses to this question have been inadequate. Thus, this study revisits the issue by introducing a novel perspective, particularly drawing on the thought of Allama Tabatabai: (Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i was an Iranian scholar, theorist, philosopher and one of the most prominent thinkers of modern Shia Islam.)
 
Literature Review
1. Early Perspectives
* Mercantilists: They believed that freely pursued self-interest conflicts with public interest, necessitating extensive state intervention. This view was rooted in Greek and Scholastic thought, which regarded self-interest as potentially destructive.
* Physiocrats: Introducing the concept of "natural law," the Physiocrats opposed mercantilism. Though often associated with laissez-faire, they advocated state intervention in agriculture, which they considered the only productive sector.
* Adam Smith: Smith legitimized the pursuit of self-interest in economics through the "invisible hand," arguing that such behavior unintentionally promotes public good. His innovation lay not in emphasizing self-interest but in reconciling it with public good without requiring conscious intent.
* Liberalism: From the 17th to 19th centuries, liberalism emphasized individual freedom in pursuing self-interest, asserting that markets, through competition and equal access, could maximize societal welfare, leading to the idea of minimal state intervention (laissez-faire).
2. Critical Perspectives
* John Stuart Mill: Adopting a utilitarian approach, Mill challenged the universality of laissez-faire, identifying three scenarios where self-interest does not align with public good: spillover effects, individuals’ inability to discern their true interests, and information asymmetry (e.g., in labor-employer relations).
* Henry Sidgwick: He also highlighted the divergence between private and public interests, advocating state intervention in specific cases.
* Alfred Marshall: Analyzing varying returns in industries, Marshall proposed protective policies for increasing-return industries and restrictive measures for decreasing-return ones.
* Arthur Pigou: Pigou emphasized "market failure," presenting cases where self-interest and public good diverge. Unlike his predecessors, he dismissed skepticism toward government, recommending state intervention to address inefficiencies.
* John Maynard Keynes: In The End of Laissez-Faire, Keynes rejected natural liberty as the basis of economic behavior, confining it to philosophical and political domains, and attributed the assumption of harmony between self-interest and public good to economists’ oversimplification.
3. Contemporary Perspectives
* Ronald Coase: Emphasizing property rights and negligible transaction costs, he argued that private actors could manage externalities without state intervention.
* Public Choice Theory (Buchanan & Tullock): Assuming self-interested behavior in public institutions, this school equated government inefficiency with market failure, rejecting state intervention as a definitive solution.
* Behavioral Economics (Kahneman & Thaler): Challenging the rational-agent assumption, this field demonstrated that individuals do not always act selfishly, as social and ethical considerations influence behavior.
* Neuroeconomics: Examining neural and emotional processes, it linked the complex relationship between self-interest and public good to the nature of choices (short-term vs. long-term).
Theoretical Framework: This study analyzed the issue based on three principles derived from Allama Tabatabai’s thought:
1. The Principle of Need: Humans are inherently needy, with needs evolving from traditional (food, clothing, shelter) to modern (digital communication, advanced healthcare, innovative payment systems). These needs necessitate social interaction, as individuals cannot fulfill them alone.
2. The Principle of Mutual Employment: Tabatabai argues that fulfilling needs requires "mutual employment," where individuals engage others to meet their needs while serving others in return. This principle underpins social formation, though unregulated cooperation may lead to conflict and exploitation.
3. The Principle of Conflict in Resource Utilization: Human efforts to fulfill needs through nature and society inevitably entail conflicts due to resource scarcity and unlimited desires, manifesting in disputes ranging from minor (e.g., land ownership) to major (e.g., wars over oil).
Analysis and Alternative Perspective: Critiquing two strategic errors in traditional approaches, this study proposed an alternative view:
1. Error of Universal Generalization: Many thinkers have sought a universal relationship between self-interest and public good, overlooking contextual complexities. Even limited exceptions (e.g., Mill’s cases) fail to rectify this overgeneralization.
2. Error of Imprecise Classification: Conventional economic categorization of goods (based on rivalry and excludability) into private, public, common-pool, and club goods ignores substantive differences. For instance, can fishing lakes and oil reserves be managed similarly?
The alternative perspective, inspired by Tabatabai, posits that the relationship between self-interest and public good is attribute-dependent, requiring case-by-case analysis based on three criteria:
* Key Actors: Who is involved in producing, distributing, or consuming the good?
* Scope of Self-Interest: To what extent can self-interest be pursued under full freedom?
* Extent of Impact: How far do self-interested actions affect others or society?
This analysis suggests that resource management mechanisms should operate along a fuzzy spectrum (from complete freedom to maximal state intervention), tailored to each good’s specific attributes.
Conclusion: The alternative approach, rooted in Tabatabai’s principles of need, mutual employment, and conflict, advocates a case-specific examination of the self-interest–public good relationship. This challenges traditional generalizations and conventional goods classifications. The policy implication is designing resource allocation mechanisms based on each sector’s unique nature—from market freedom for certain goods to state regulation for sensitive resources—thereby reducing conflicts and fostering equitable public good realization.
JEL classification: B13, B30, D70, P51, Z13.

Keywords


  1. خیری‌دوست لنگرودی، زهرا؛ مؤمنی، فرشاد و امیر خادم علیزاده. (1399). «تأثیر و اهمیت فرهنگ در مکاتب نئوکلاسیک و نهادگرایی جدید». نشریه اقتصاد و بانکداری اسلامی، 9(۳۲): ۵۳-۷۷.
  2. رضایی، محمدجواد و مهدی موحدی بک‌‌نظر. (1399). «روایتی عدالت بنیان از اقتصاد «اثباتی»؛ تقریری از کارکرد علم اقتصاد و نسبت آن با علم اقتصاد اسلامی». مطالعات اقتصاد اسلامی، 13(1 و پیاپی 25): 155-180.
  3. طباطبایی، سیدمحمدحسین. (1374). ت‍رج‍م‍ه ت‍ف‍س‍ی‍ر ال‍م‍ی‍زان. ترجمه سید محمدباقر موسوی همدانی، جلد 8، جامعه مدرسین حوزه علمیه قم، قم: دفتر انتشارات اسلامی.
  4. عرب بافرانی، بهنام؛ موسایی، میثم و علی‌اصغر هادوی‌نیا. (1398). «کارکرد نظام انگیزشی مستخرج از الگوی اسلامی ایرانی پیشرفت در اقتصاد فرهنگ». نشریه اقتصاد و بانکداری اسلامی، 8(28): 287-313.
  5. کریمی، علی‌اکبر؛ میرمعزی، سیدحسین و سیدرضا حسینی. (1398). «بررسی تطبیقی شاخصه‌های مصرف‌گرایی غربی و الگوی اسلامی مصرف». اقتصاد و بانکداری اسلامی، 8(26): 151-177.
  6. مطهری، مرتضی. (1377). اصول فلسفه و روش رئالیسم. جلد 2، تهران: صدرا.
  7. موحدی، مهدی؛ نعمتی، محمد و محمدجواد رضایی. (1397). «فقه تعاملات اجتماعی»؛ یا نگاهی نو به روش، هدف و گستره موضوعی اقتصاد اسلامی در تدوین الگوی اسلامی ایرانی پیشرفت، هفتمین کنفرانس الگوی اسلامی ایرانی پیشرفت؛ از الگوی پایه به‌سوی الگوی اسلامی ایرانی پیشرفت.
  8. مؤمنی، فرشاد؛ پاداش، حمید؛ خادم علیزاده، امیر و رامینه سلیمانزاده. (1399). «واکاوی نسبت بین نشانه‌شناسی و توسعه در چارچوب عقاید مکتب نهادگرایی». پژوهشنامه اقتصادی، 20(77): 136-189.

 

References

  1. Arabbafrani, B., Musai, M., Hadavinia, A. (2019). Amalkard-e Nezam-e Engezāshi az Model-e Eslami-ye Irāni-ye Pishraft dar Eqtesād-e Farhangi. Majalleh-ye Eqtesād-e Eslami va Bānkdāri (The Functioning of the Motivational System Extracted from the Iranian Islamic Model of Progress in Cultural Economy). Islamic Economics and Banking Journal, *8*(28), 287–313. [In Persian].
  2. Backhouse, R. E., & Medema, S. G. (2008). Laissez-faire, Economists and. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
  3. Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy.
  4. Coase, R. H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, *3*, 1–44.
  5. Dahrendorf, R. (2008). Liberalism and Economics. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
  6. Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom: The Relation Between Economic Freedom and Political Freedom.
  7. Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, *162*(3859), 1243–1248.
  8. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
  9. Karimi, A. A., Mirmoezi, S. H., & Hosseini, S. R. (2019). Barrasi-ye Tatbighi-ye Vizhegihā-ye Masrafgerāyi-ye Gharbi va Model-e Masraf-e Eslami. Majalleh-ye Eqtesād-e Eslami va Bānkdāri (A Comparative Study of the Characteristics of Western Consumerism and the Islamic Consumption Model). Journal of Islamic Economics and Banking, *8*(26), 151–177. [In Persian].
  10. Keynes, J. M. (1924). Alfred Marshall, 1842–1924. The Economic Journal, *34*(135), 311–372.
  11. Keynes, J. M. (1939). Preface to the French Edition of the General Theory. The Collected Writings, *7*.
  12. Keynes, J. M. (2010 [1926]). The End of Laissez-Faire. In Essays in Persuasion (pp. 272–294). Palgrave Macmillan.
  13. Keynes, J. M. (2018 [1936]). The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Springer.
  14. Kheiridoost Langaroodi, Z., Momeni, F., & Khadem Alizadeh, A. (2020). Tasir-e Nāhādhā-ye Ghayr-e Rasmi bar Towse’eh-ye Eqtesādi (The Effect of Informal Institutions on Economic Development). Economics and Banking Journal, *9*(32), 53–77. [In Persian].
  15. Marshall, A. (1920). Industry and Trade.
  16. Medema, S. G. (2009). The Hesitant Hand: Taming Self-Interest in the History of Economic Ideas. Princeton University Press.
  17. Mill, J. S. (1909 [1871]). Principles of Political Economy (7th ed.). Longmans.
  18. Mill, J. S. (1874). Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy. JW Parker.
  19. Mill, J. S. (1992 [1859]). On Liberty. Classics of Liberty Library.
  20. Momeni, F., Padash, H., Khadem Alizadeh, A., & Soleimanzadeh, R. (2019). Tahlil-e Rabeteh-ye Semiotik va Towse’eh dar Chārchub-e Andishehā-ye Maktab-e Sākhtārgerāyi (Analysis of the Relationship between Semiotics and Development Within the Framework of the Ideas of the Institutionalist School). Economic Research Journal, *20*(77), 136–189. [In Persian].
  21. Motahari, M. (1998). Osul-e Falsafeh va Ravesh-e Realism (Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism) (Vol. 2). Sadra. [In Persian].
  22. Movahedi, M., Nemati, M., & Rezaei, M. J. (2018). Fiqh-e Ravābet-e Ejtemā’i; yā Negāhi-e Jadid be Ravesh, Hadaf va Hozeye-ye Mozu’i-ye Eqtesād-e Eslami dar Tarb-e Model-e Eslami-ye Irāni-ye Pishraft (Jurisprudence of Social Interactions; or a New Look at the Method, Purpose, and Thematic Scope of Islamic Economics in the Formulation of the Iranian Islamic Model of Progress). Seventh Conference on the Iranian Islamic Model of Progress, 1–20. [In Persian].
  23. Pigou, A. (2017). The Economics of Welfare. Routledge.
  24. Rezaei, M. J., & Movahedi Baknazar, M. (2020). Tafsir-e Edālat-Mabnā-ye ‘Positiv’ dar Eqtesād; Towsifi az Kārkard-e Eqtesād va Rabeteh-ye ān bā Eqtesād-e Eslami (A Justice-Based Interpretation of ‘Positive’ Economics; An Exposition of the Function of Economics and Its Relation to Islamic Economics). Journal of Islamic Economics, *13*(1), 155–180. [In Persian].
  25. Sidgwick, H. (1901). The Principles of Political Economy (Vol. 132). Kraus Reprint.
  26. Smith, A. (1977). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. University of Chicago Press.
  27. Tabatabaei, S. M. H. (1995). Tafsir al-Mizan (Vol. 8, S. M. B. Mousavi Hamedani, Trans.). Islamic Publications Office. [In Persian].
  28. Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health. Yale University Press.
  29. Zak, P. J. (2012). The Moral Molecule: The Source of Love and Prosperity. Penguin Group USA.
  30. Whittaker, R. H. (1975). Communities and Ecosystems (2nd ed.). MacMillan Publishing.