Financial Punishment (Ta'zir) and Deterrent Taxation in Islamic Jurisprudence with a Case Study of Speculation

The expansion of short-term and speculative transactions in markets such as currency, gold, housing, and automobiles in Iran's economy is considered one of the factors exacerbating asset inflation, forming price bubbles, and diverting capital away from productive sectors. In this regard, the "Law on Taxation of Speculation and Gambling" has been enacted as a regulatory and deterrent policy. The main question of this research is whether a deterrent tax on speculation is legitimate from the perspective of Imamiyyah jurisprudence, and if so, within which jurisprudential framework it can be analyzed — especially considering that many speculative transactions are conducted in the form of valid sales (bay') with a serious intention of transferring ownership, and cannot be categorically deemed void or forbidden.



This research, employing a descriptive-analytical method and relying on library sources, while examining the foundations of transactional jurisprudence and governmental jurisprudence, demonstrates that deterrent taxes cannot be analyzed merely within the framework of income tax. Rather, if a type-based corruption (mafsadah naw'iyyah) and disruption of the economic system are established, such taxes can fall under the concept of "financial ta'zir" and the discretionary authority of the ruling authority (wali al-amr) in Islamic policy. The findings indicate that principles such as maintaining the system (hifz al-nizam), the rule of no harm (la darar) — as supporting the necessity of intervention — and the prohibition of consuming others' wealth unjustly (akl mal bi al-batil) provide the necessary capacity to justify governmental intervention in corruptive economic behaviors. Accordingly, a deterrent tax is not meant to legitimize speculation but rather serves as a tool to increase the cost of short-term profiteering and prevent the spread of economic corruptions under conditions of chronic inflation and insufficient growth. Furthermore, by critically raising and examining objections such as the conflict between deterrent taxes and the principle of the validity of transactions (asl sihhat al-mu'amalat) and the sanctity of a Muslim's wealth (hurmat mal al-muslim), and by citing jurisprudential examples such as hoarding (ihtikar) and governmental market interventions, an attempt has been made to offer a coherent framework for justifying this policy within Imamiyyah jurisprudence.



The research concludes that a tax on speculation and gambling, if grounded in public corruption, accompanied by the observance of proportionality, tax justice, transparency, and the possibility of oversight and objection, is compatible with Imamiyyah jurisprudence and can be considered one of the instances of financial ta'zir and a regulatory tool of the Islamic government to reduce market volatility and direct capital toward productive activities.